Deterrence and Reform Policies in Relief Organizations: An Operational Framework for Enhancing the Integrity of Their Work in Yemen

Abstract

This study examined the effectiveness of deterrence policies and institutional reform in relief organizations working in conflict settings, with Yemen as the focal case, by designing a practical framework to reduce corruption and strengthen integrity. Based on the premise that conventional oversight mechanisms are insufficient in contexts of weak rule of law and complex social dynamics, it assessed the role of firm deterrence measures and contractual governance. Using a mixed-methods design, the research combined a survey of 150 relief experts and workers with qualitative interviews. Findings showed strong support for administrative deterrence, with “denial of promotions” scoring highest (M = 4.04), followed by “mandatory transparency,” while “social shaming” received limited endorsement due to cultural sensitivities. Consequently, the study proposed an integrated framework built on deterrence, institutional reform, and community oversight, and recommended the adoption of binding legal contracts to reinforce accountability and ensure aid is allocated efficiently.